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Fig. 1. The SafetyLens Compare view: (A) Project Panel comprising the visualization canvas and three tabs: (1) Nodes, (2) Links, and
(3) Trace, (B) Shared Nodes Panel with three nodes (Hazards) selected and highlighted across all three projects (ellipses), (C) Detail
View Panel showing details of a node (System Behavior ) hovered in Project-B (), and (D) opens into a Control Panel comprising
search and filter controls.
Abstract— Modern automobiles have evolved from just being mechanical machines to having full-fledged electronics systems that
enhance vehicle dynamics and driver experience. However, these complex hardware and software systems, if not properly designed,
can experience failures that can compromise the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. For example,
a system to activate the brakes to avoid a collision saves lives when it functions properly, but could lead to tragic outcomes if the
brakes were applied in a way that’s inconsistent with the design. Broadly speaking, the analysis performed to minimize such risks
falls into a systems engineering domain called Functional Safety. In this paper, we present SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool to
assist engineers and analysts in analyzing automotive Functional Safety datasets. SafetyLens combines techniques including network
exploration and visual comparison to help analysts perform domain-specific tasks. This paper presents the design study with domain
experts that resulted in the design guidelines, the tool, and user feedback.
Index Terms—Visual data analysis, Design study, Network visualization, Functional safety, Automotive engineering.
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Modern automobiles come integrated with a complex suite of systems
(e.g. Anti-lock Braking System) that deploy hardware components
integrated with millions of lines of software code. In a system that is
not designed properly, the sheer number and complexity of components
can result in failures posing risks which if not appropriately handled
can be detrimental to the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and
the surrounding environment. Recalls can tarnish a manufacturers
brand, straining customer trust and loyalty. It is important to design
and manufacture vehicles in a way that may assist in reducing the
risk. To analyze a given design, several systems engineering analysis
techniques exist, which include but are not limited to Failure Mode
Effect Analysis [52], Fault Tree Analysis [35], etc.
Our work here is focused on Functional Safety in the automotive
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sector. To understand what Functional Safety is and how domain ex-
perts use it to ensure vehicle safety, consider an example scenario of the
“Adaptive Cruise Control” system whose objective is to accelerate
(or decelerate) the vehicle to maintain a reference speed as set by the
driver. However, an improperly designed system could malfunction
causing the vehicle to continuously accelerate (or decelerate). For ex-
ample, when the vehicle is overtaking, if acceleration was to continue,
and not be controlled by the driver, it can lead to a collision. To mini-
mize risk associated with this mishap, a goal to not accelerate more
than required is set. To achieve this goal, a requirement to be able to
override acceleration when brake pedal is pressed is defined which
in turn requires monitoring of the brake pedal sensor. Furthermore,
this may require software code to compare brake pedal sensor out-
puts for confidence and possibly additional sensors. The process of
setting these goals, testing the conditions, and analyzing the results are
all part of Functional Safety.
The above example showcases one scenario of the “Adaptive Cruise
Control” system. There are other vehicle systems (e.g., Anti-lock
Braking System, Parking Assist System) with their potential scenar-
ios (similar or different sets of expected functions, associated risks,
and safety goals). Finally, car companies have multiple car models,
with updates from year to year, each with potentially different systems.
This makes Functional Safety datasets large. Figure 2 illustrates the
“Adaptive Cruise Control” scenario in the form of a network with each
node representing an entity. The purple boxes indicate the correspond-
ing Functional Safety terminologies for the entities in the example
(described in Section 2.1).
Functional Safety domain experts are engineers and analysts who
can identify and assess hazards, set goals to minimize risks associated
with these hazards, and define safety requirements to achieve these
goals. They must also ensure smooth implementation of these goals
by asking questions such as “Are there any scenarios where there is
an unreasonable risk for which there is no safety goal?”, “Are there
hazards in the current project that were also addressed in another
project? If so, what safety goals were identified for them?”, and others.
We designed and developed SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool
to assist domain experts to better understand functional safety datasets.
Through a three-month-long user-centered design process comprising
interviews, demos, and discussions with domain experts from a multina-
tional automobile company, we derived design goals and user tasks that
drove our work. After a final phase of user feedback on the prototype,
SafetyLens is currently being deployed.
The primary contributions of this paper include (i) design goals and
challenges in supporting visual analysis of Functional Safety datasets,
(ii) SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool that helps domain experts
visualize and interact with functional safety datasets, (iii) usage scenar-
ios that illustrate how SafetyLens can aid the current analysis processes
of domain experts, and (iv) feedback from domain experts about the
design, functionality, and impact of SafetyLens.
2 INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND
Functional Safety analyses are performed in several domains such as
Military Aviation [14], Space [49], Medical [32], Automotive [31], etc.
Our work here is focused on Functional Safety of vehicles within the
automotive systems engineering domain. ISO 26262 titled “Functional
Safety - Road Vehicles” [31] is the international standard for the design
and development of automotive electrical and electronic systems that
makes Functional Safety a part of the automotive product development
life-cycle. It is a risk-based safety standard, where the risk from haz-
ardous situations is qualitatively assessed leading to the definition of
safety measures that minimize these risks.
2.1 Concepts
This section introduces concepts and terminology associated with Func-
tional Safety from the perspective of ISO 26262. These also describe
the Functional Safety datasets used in SafetyLens. When modeled as a
network, they make up the nodes, links, and attributes.
SYSTEM refers to a classification of automotive electrical and elec-
tronic systems such as “Adaptive Cruise Control” and “Chassis” on
Element Type Abb. Description
System Behavior SB An expected behavior of an electri-
cal/electronic System in a vehicle.
Malfunctioning
Behavior
MB A failure or unintended behaviour of
an item with respect to its design in-
tent.
Situation Sit A vehicular operational scenario.
Hazard Haz A potential source of harm.
Hazardous Event HzE A dangerous condition arising out of
a Situation and a Hazard.
Safety Goal SG A requirement to eliminate (or mini-
mize) Hazards.
Functional Safety
Requirement
FSR A requirement to achieve the func-
tional or behavioral aspects of a Safety
Goal.
Technical Safety
Requirement
TSR A technical requirement to meet a
Functional Safety Requirement.
Software Safety
Requirement
SSR A software-level requirement.
Hardware Safety
Requirement
HSR A hardware-level requirement.
Table 1. A description of the Types of Elements in the context of automo-
tive Functional Safety. Other Element Types such as Physical, Logical,
and Assumptions exist but are beyond the scope of this paper.
which Functional Safety is performed.
PROJECT refers to an instance of a System, e.g., “Chassis for Model
Z”. This is also an instance of a Functional Safety dataset.
ELEMENT refers to an entity within a Project (e.g., “Vehicle should
not accelerate more than required.”). Elements constitute nodes in a
Functional Safety network.
TYPE refers to a group of similar Elements within a Project, e.g. Mal-
functioning Behaviors (MB), described in Table 1. Type is an attribute
of the nodes in Functional Safety networks.
RELATION refers to the relationship between two Elements. For ex-
ample, a Relation “associatedSG” indicates that a Safety Goal (SG)
has been assigned to a Hazardous Event (HzE). Relations constitute
the links in Functional Safety networks. Some of these Relations are
shown in the Links column in Figure 5.
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level, or ASIL, is a nominal at-
tribute assigned to an Element (node) indicating its relative risk level. It
can take one of four values: {A, B, C, D}. An Element that is assigned
an ASIL=D indicates the highest risk. ASIL=A indicates the lowest risk.
A special value QM indicates that quality management processes are
sufficient to manage the identified risk [31].
2.2 Workflow
Functional Safety is a broad process ranging from the design through to
the manufacturing and quality management of vehicles. The processes
relevant to our work here comprise the following:
HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HARA): Domain
experts first determine potential hazards that can be triggered by the
malfunctioning of one or more system components and/or processes.
These hazards are classified based on their Severity (S), Exposure (E),
and Controllability (C). Severity is an estimate of the extent of harm
to one or more individuals that can occur in a potentially hazardous
situation. Exposure is a measure of the probability of being in a haz-
ardous situation. Controllability is an estimate of the driver’s ability to
avoid harm or damage through timely reactions. These are qualitative
ratings with Severity={S1, S2, S3}, Exposure={E0, E1, E2, E3, E4},
and Controllability={C0, C1, C2, C3}. Based on these, an Automotive
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is calculated and assigned to the corre-
sponding Hazardous Event (HzE). To minimize the risk associated with
this hazard, a Safety Goal (SG) is formulated.
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY CONCEPT (FSC): From the formulated SG,
Malfunctioning	Behavior
"vehicle	accelerates
more	than	required"
Minimum	Risk
Hazardous	Event
"continued	acceleration"
Safety	Goal
"vehicle	should	not	accelerate
more	than	required"
Functional	Safety	Requirement
"Override	acceleration	
when	a	brake	pedal	is	pressed"
Hazard
"collision"
Hardware	Safety	Requirement
"additional	brake
pedal	sensors"
Software	Safety	Requirement
"compare	brake	pedal	sensor
outputs	for	confidence"
Technical	Safety	Requirement
"Monitor	the	brake	pedal
application"
System
"Adaptive	Cruise	Control"
System	Behavior
"accelerate	/	decelerate
vehicle	to	a	reference	speed"
Situation
"overtaking"
Fig. 2. A hypothetical scenario of an “Adaptive Cruise Control” system on which Functional Safety is performed. Purple boxes indicate the Element
Types described in Table 1.
Functional Safety Requirements (FSR) are derived. These define a
system architecture to achieve the SGs.
TECHNICAL SAFETY CONCEPT (TSC): The technical safety con-
cept comprises all Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) along with
their allocations to system, hardware or software elements. These are
refinements of the corresponding FSRs.
In practice, Functional Safety analysts and engineers can use a combi-
nation of commercial and open source tools to perform their day-to-day
tasks. The Functional Safety processes can either be performed and
documented in such tools or using traditional approaches such as Excel
sheets and Word documents. For instance, our domain collaborators
have utilized a domain-specific language (DSL) for ISO 26262 that
enables them to import artifacts from HARA, FSC, TSC into a model.
They use this model to generate Word documents with information on
functional safety that was performed on a system.
There can be several challenges in the above workflow, especially in
the translation of an assigned ASIL into a Technical Safety Concept.
Assigning an ASIL is a complex process that can involve discussions
among multiple teams. Further, ASIL assignments can be modified at
different functional safety stages and points in time. The introduction of
model-based systems engineering (MBSE) approaches may solve part
of the problem as collaborators can now exchange information using
a common language like SysML [41]. However, this may still have
limitations when the scale and complexity of data increases. Finally,
analyzing multiple projects to detect shared components and problems
is not supported, and hence, a core focus of SafetyLens.
2.3 Data
Each Project constitutes an instance of a Functional Safety dataset. As
seen in Figure 2, this can be modeled as a network with nodes and links.
Each node represents a functional safety Element with seven attributes:
{ID, Name, Type, ASIL, Severity, Exposure, Controllability}. A link
between two nodes represents the Relation between two Elements and
has three attributes: {Source, Target, Relation}.
The dataset has several properties. First, a node of a particular Type
can be connected to zero (orphan), one, or more nodes of some other
Type. Second, Functional Safety Requirement (FSR) and Technical
Safety Requirement (TSR) nodes can be connected to nodes of the same
Type as themselves. Third, a dataset can comprise nodes and links
that are common to other projects (e.g., the same hazard (HzE) can
arise due to different malfunctioning system behaviors (MB)). Fourth,
these common nodes may be assigned different ASIL values. Finally, a
standard Functional Safety network may consist of multiple nodes and
links with the vehicle itself having multiple systems. This scale and
complexity makes Functional Safety datasets large, and make the tasks
of our domain experts challenging.
3 RELATED WORK
NETWORK VISUALIZATIONS Since a functional safety dataset can
be modeled as a network, we explored existing literature in network vi-
sualization systems for inspiration. There are a number of open source,
free, or commercially available software [5,8,9,13,50], toolkits [27,39],
and research prototypes [33,48,54]. Multiple survey reports [11,28,55]
have not only summarized the state-of-the-art of network visualiza-
tions and techniques but also discussed their general evolution. We
review Saket et al.’s evaluation study that indicated node-link-group
visualizations as more “enjoyable” than node-link visualizations [43]
as a potential technique to represent the functional safety network. A
core functional safety task is to compare projects (networks) hence we
review Gove, R.’s V3SPA, a visual analysis tool (for security policy
workers) to explore and find differences between large complex net-
works (SELinux and SEAndroid security policies) [26]. Another core
functional safety task is to find and visualize connections and/or paths
between elements (nodes) hence we also review existing work in route
tracing techniques. Candela et al. have developed Radian, an internet
probe that helps visualize trace route paths [17]. Fischer et al. have
developed Vistracer to investigate routing anomalies in traceroutes [21].
Zhao et al have developed MissBin which infers the existence of unseen
(missing) links based on currently observed ones by involving the user
to sensemake the predicted results [57].
SET VISUALIZATIONS Another functional safety task involves com-
paring graphs to find common nodes and links. For this, we explored
existing literature in set visualization. Euler and Venn diagrams are
the most common methods to visualize sets and their intersections.
Euler diagrams represent each set as a geometric shape and show the
intersections by overlapping the shapes. Venn diagrams are like Euler
diagrams but show all intersections, including empty ones. Sadana et
al. [42] developed Onset to represent large-scale binary set data. Lex
et al.’s UpSet technique used a set view and element view to visual-
ize intersections in a matrix layout introducing aggregates based on
groupings and queries [36]. Alsallakh et al.’s survey paper discusses
the state-of-the-art of set visualization systems and techniques [2].
VISUAL ANALYTICS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE DOMAIN Perhaps most
relevant to this paper is previous work on visualization applied to the
automotive industry. These had been mostly in the context of scientific
visualization, computer aided design (CAD), and virtual reality [53].
Considerably less work was dedicated to the systems engineering do-
main until recently. Basole et al. developed visual analytics tools to
help users perform Complex Engineered System (CES) design analy-
sis tasks helping stakeholders with visualizations of complex design
models [7] and understand Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) data
by modelling and visualizing it as a network [6]. Sedlmair et al. have
Understanding	domain	and	gathering	requirements
Brainstorming	design	ideas	(low	fidelity	prototyping)
Rapid	software	prototyping
Collaborator	discussion	and	feedback
Implementing	initial	prototype
Demonstration	to	domain	experts
Implementing	full	system
Deploying	system
2019 2020
may sep janjan
2018
oct
Fig. 3. The high-level phases and milestones of the design process.
developed multiple tools leveraging visual analytics in the electronic
engineering domain for vehicle development and testing. One such tool
is Cardiogram, that helps engineers debug millions of recorded mes-
sages from safety-critical in-car communication networks and ensure
that they are error-free [47]. RelEx helps engineers specify and opti-
mize traffic patterns for in-car communication networks [45]. MostVis
facilitates exploration of MOST function catalogs which was otherwise
infeasible using paper and existing database interfaces [44]. Another
tool was a dual-view visualization system that helped diagnostics of
in-car communication networks [46].
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY is a critical operation in automotive systems
engineering whose methodologies [15, 30, 31] and applications [12, 18,
29,56] have been extensively researched in literature. Several processes
in systems engineering such as design reviews are often still conducted
using unstructured documents (e.g., Excel sheets [37]) which is non-
standard, inconsistent, and can cause miscommunication [22]. Part of
the problem was solved by the introduction of model-based systems
engineering (MBSE) approaches that encourage information exchange
using a common language [41] (e.g., SysML [24]). There exist several
tools now, both commercial [1, 3] as well as open-source [23, 51] that
support commonly performed tasks in systems engineering. However,
these advances have resulted in more complex models and user tasks.
In general, these existing tools focus their user experience and func-
tionality on the authoring of the information. These are valuable for
creating the information, but lack user interface affordances for commu-
nicating and exploring the data for various tasks described in subsequent
sections. Moreover, these applications cannot be customized to support
newer or more advanced types of tasks. For example, comparing multi-
ple projects or visualizing the ASIL trace and decomposition cannot be
easily accomplished in these tools. The potential application of view-
ing functional safety data in a visual analysis tool is under-explored,
motivating the need for this work.
4 DESIGN PROCESS AND DOMAIN REQUIREMENTS
We adopted a user-centered design methodology and conducted a series
of design activities to learn about Functional Safety, the requirements
and tasks of the domain experts, and distill design goals that ultimately
ground SafetyLens (see Figure 3). This process included formative
evaluation, design sessions, and iterative prototype development.
First, we conducted interviews with functional safety engineers, an-
alysts, and supervisors to understand the domain requirements and
user tasks. We conducted these interviews remotely (using telecon-
ference applications with video and screensharing capabilities) over
the course of three months, with one session per week. Generally, the
sessions lasted 1 hour, with 1-4 domain experts on the calls. These
sessions consisted of semi-structured interviews that started with ques-
tions to learn about their tasks, roles, and responsibilities. We gained
an understanding of the current design ecosystem of tools, tasks, and
datasets. We learned about the questions they have to answer as part of
their daily activities, and specifically how those relate to the different
datasets, databases, and other sources of information (e.g., manuals,
regulations, etc.). We learned about the current workflow and identified
25 commonly performed tasks.
Second, we began design exercises to explore potential visualization
and interaction techniques. We sketched ideas on paper and shared
them with our collaborators during subsequent sessions. These sketches
included potential visualization techniques (e.g., tree maps, force di-
rected networks, hive plots), UI widgets (e.g., sliders, dropdowns,
buttons), UI layouts (e.g., panels, grids), workflows, and interactions.
These were low-fidelity designs sketched quickly but detailed enough
to catch errors and slips that could surface later. During these sessions,
we collaboratively brainstormed on the pros and cons of each design
which eventually resulted in multiple changes and refinements. We also
realized these designs by developing rapid software prototypes with
a dual purpose of exploring potential technologies for the tool (such
as software libraries and packages) and evaluating the feasibility of
the designs. We deployed these prototypes for the domain experts to
interact and evaluate them based on their usability and visual look and
feel, with small subsets of their data integrated into the prototypes. This
helped discard less-useful designs, fine-tune our initial set of tasks, and
derive 6 design goals.
Third, we designed and developed an initial prototype of SafetyLens
and conducted an in-person demo and feedback session. This consisted
of two half-day sessions with domain experts comprising functional
safety analysts, project managers, and personnel from application-
specific teams (e.g., chassis, power-train) who were split into two
groups. The first session included 15 participants (7 in-person, 8 on-
line), and the second one included 20 participants (6 in-person, 14
online). Each session consisted of a presentation of the design goals
and supported user tasks, followed by a demonstration of the prototype.
One researcher presented the prototype and led the discussion, while a
second took notes on participants’ feedback. The participants engaged
in thoughtful discussions about the demonstrated usage scenarios. They
had access to sticky notes to keep track of comments throughout the
presentation (with remote participants being able to use chat and other
messaging services to give their feedback). Also, screen-shots were
given to each participant to annotate with comments, changes, or other
visual cues about how to improve the interface and interaction design.
Finally, a whiteboard was used by the in-person participants to
illustrate how attributes from different databases can be integrated into
SafetyLens. These discussions led to refinements to existing features,
as well as new tasks that the tool could support. The user tasks and
design goals presented below are those that resulted from this second
round of user feedback.
4.1 User Tasks
User tasks which SafetyLens should support are:
• Discover patterns within projects; e.g., a project has elements that
are mostly assigned an ASIL=D (high risk).
• Find missing (otherwise must-have) links between nodes; e.g.,
{MB→ HzE}, {HzE→ SG}, {SG→ FSR}, {FSR→ TSR}.
• Look up and analyze a node’s end-to-end traceability (i.e., the
extent to which functional safety elements have been defined);
e.g. {MB→ HzE→ SG→ FSR→ TSR}.
• Compare ASILs by analyzing their decomposition into their S-E-
C (Severity, Exposure, and Controllability) constituents.
• Find common nodes and links among projects; (e.g., Hazards
(Haz) that exist in multiple projects).
• Discover anomalies across projects; (e.g., the same Hazardous
Event (HzE) is assigned a different ASIL across projects).
• Compare key metrics across projects; (e.g., counts and distribu-
tion of nodes and links within projects).
• Get an overview of current and past projects to monitor status.
4.2 Design Goals
From the design exercises and requirements gathering activities de-
scribed above we identified the following design goals.
DG1: FACILITATE EXPLORATION OF A PROJECT User tasks such
as “Find missing links”, “Lookup and analyze a nodes end-to-end trace-
ability” are network exploration tasks. Hence, we modeled Functional
Safety data as a network and derived this design goal to support tasks
like fetching node details on hover, finding adjacent nodes, and finding
paths from one node to another based on the taxonomies by Lee et
al. [34] and Pretorius et al. [40].
DG2: FACILITATE COMPARISON AMONG PROJECTS Teams
within functional safety can be system-specific and may not always
be aware of the day to day progress made by other teams. This may
result in duplicate work (e.g., a team may re-implement an artifact from
scratch instead of re-using the one already implemented by another
team, or for another vehicle). A core goal for SafetyLens, thus, was
to provide a unified interface where users can explore and compare
multiple projects to find shared (common) nodes, links, or even sub-
graphs (combination of nodes and links). This unified interface can
foster better collaboration among teams while also saving time and
resources for the organization.
DG3: DISCOVER PATTERNS AND ANOMALIES The domain ex-
perts we spoke to make use of existing commercial and open source
tools. These tools support basic exploration and comparison of Func-
tional Safety projects but may fall short when the scale and complexity
of data increases. Thus, SafetyLens should support discovering inter-
esting patterns within and across projects.
DG4: FACILITATE TRACEABILITY AND DECOMPOSITION OF
ASILS An important task for domain experts is to trace the ASIL
from one node to another (e.g., {MB→ HzE→ SG→ FSR→ TSR}).
Since ASILs determine the extent of safety mechanisms for elements,
any discrepancy such as an element assigned an ASIL=A instead of
ASIL=D is an important concern. To diagnose the problem, users
should be able to decompose the ASIL into its Severity (S), Exposure
(E), and Controllability (C). Thus, it is an important design goal for
SafetyLens to unify tasks allowing users to efficiently detect, diagnose,
and fix ASIL assignment issues.
DG5: SUPPORT DIFFERENT USER GROUPS Functional Safety con-
sists of engineers, analysts, and managers all of whom perform analysis
and decision-making tasks at different levels. While engineers and
analysts are concerned with lower element-level tasks within projects,
managers are concerned with higher project-level tasks. SafetyLens
should support both along the functional safety organization hierarchy.
DG6: PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF KEY METRICS The user tasks
suggested that key metrics should be readily available (e.g., total num-
ber of nodes, total number of nodes with ASIL=D, etc).
In addition to these design goals, we had to consider other factors.
Since Functional Safety datasets can get large, we had to design for
scalability and performance. We utilized a graph database to persist
the data and execute queries to offload computation on the browser.
Further, we had to ensure our tool is easy-to-deploy and integrates well
with existing systems and workflows (e.g., the use of linked spread-
sheets that are local to groups and users as well as shared databases).
Finally, our users are from the automotive domain and not visualization
practitioners, hence SafetyLens needs a simple user experience.
4.3 Design Considerations
Since we modeled Functional Safety data as a network we considered
several network visualization techniques. We implemented rapid proto-
types of standard visualization techniques such as hive-plots, dot-matrix
plots, and parallel coordinate charts. These had a number of shortcom-
ings. First, due to the number of links between nodes, edge-crossings
can get messy. Second, positioning the nodes linearly in hive-plots
made it difficult to discover patterns (e.g., distribution of ASILs). The
dot-matrix plot enabled discovering patterns but give an impression
that the {x,y} spatial coordinates of each node are of importance which
was not the case. Third, parallel coordinates charts failed because the
nodes had connections with more than two types of nodes.
We implemented a force-directed network with a multi-body force
algorithm generating node positions at random. However, similar
Fig. 4. The Dashboard View shows available projects. The projects
in the node-link group visualization on the left are clustered as well
as colored based on their “System” (configured from the Cluster by
dropdown to the top-right of the Table View.
nodes (e.g., Elements with the same Type) were scattered throughout
the canvas making pattern discovery difficult. Inspired by Saket et
al’s study that found node-link-group diagrams more “enjoyable” than
node-link diagrams [43], we augmented our visualization with circle
packing (to group similar nodes together within a cluster), and collision
detection (to prevent overlaps between clusters and nodes) algorithms to
achieve our goal. To facilitate interactive exploration and “fluidity” [20],
we provide affordances to drag the clusters within the canvas, brush
and link between projects by a lasso operation, and a control panel with
search and filter direct manipulation widgets.
To support comparison between projects, we show multiple node-
link-group diagrams aligned spatially. One idea was to have a single
visualization with all projects on a shared canvas. However, this had
a major shortcoming. Since projects comprise shared nodes with at-
tributes that are specific to a project (e.g., Node A in Project A has an
ASIL=B but ASIL=D in Project B), it was important to keep the nodes
and hence the projects separate. Our users are familiar with tabular
representations of data (e.g., MS Excel). Keeping their visualization
literacy in mind, we complemented each node-link-diagram with a
data table. To facilitate comparison between projects, we considered
juxtaposing the node-link-group diagram and the datatable within each
project panel and vertically stacking the project panels themselves.
Since comparing vertically is challenging, we flipped this approach and
provided drag-and-drop affordances to reorder the project panels.
5 SAFETYLENS
This section describes the main views and functionality of SafetyLens.
5.1 User Interface
SafetyLens has three primary views: 1) Dashboard View, 2) Summary
View, and 3) Compare View.
DASHBOARD VIEW, shown in Figure 4, is the landing page and pro-
vides an overview of the Functional Safety ecosystem. It consists of
a clustered node visualization with each node representing a project.
We complemented the visualization with a table to provide a familiar
interface to users who are more comfortable with data in spreadsheets.
The table consists of project-level information such as {Name, Depart-
ment, Project In-Charge, and Location}. SafetyLens supports multiple
starting points for users to analyze functional safety data. By providing
access to all projects within the organization, SafetyLens facilitates
collaboration (DG2) among domain experts with different roles (DG5).
SUMMARY VIEW, shown in Figure 5, provides a summary of the
projects selected in the Dashboard View (DG6). There are juxtaposed
heatmap visualizations for Node Type, Link Relation, and ASIL respec-
tively positioned next to each other. For each attribute table, projects
are along the column axis and the corresponding attribute values are
along the row axis. An additional column titled “S” is added to show
the number of entities (nodes and links) that are shared among these
Fig. 5. The Summary View shows three projects P1, P2, and P3 and
the distribution of nodes by their Types, links by their Relations, and
ASILs by their values. The column S is a count of shared entities (nodes
and links) between the projects. Project P1 has 318 nodes and 675 links.
The projects share 15 nodes and 0 links among them.
projects. The cells show the per-project entity counts for the correspond-
ing attribute, colored using a continuous color scale (white-to-gray) to
help the user discover patterns within as well as across projects (DG3).
COMPARE VIEW, shown in Figure 1, is the main view of the
SafetyLens interface that allows users to simultaneously perform ex-
ploratory analysis of an individual project as well as a comparative
analysis across multiple projects. It has four subviews (alphanumeric
list enumerations match with those in Figure 1):
(A) PROJECT PANEL. Each imported project is rendered as a panel
that shows the project title and utilities to (i) reset the panel state,
(ii) export the panel as an image, (iii) toggle full-screen mode,
and (iv) horizontally reorder the panel using drag and drop.
VISUALIZATION CANVAS shows a node-link group visualiza-
tion. Each node (small circle) is an Element of a functional safety
project. These nodes are clustered together based on attributes
(e.g., Type). The largest circles represent the group nodes and
are labeled with the Type and the number of nodes that are part
of it. The boundary marking the extent of the groups (convex
hull) is highlighted. The nodes are positioned in each others’
vicinity using an implementation of the circle packing algorithm.
The node size and color can be mapped to attributes such as
{ASIL, Type, Degree (number of edges to a node)} which in the
presence of multiple nodes across multiple projects will create
visual clusters leading to discoveries of patterns and anomalies
(DG3). By default, the groups are positioned relative to each
other based on the multi-body force and collision detection algo-
rithms. However, these groups are fluid and can be re-positioned
by dragging them around. Further, a control panel toggle button
enables the users to position and fix these clusters to similar rela-
tive locations across all projects to aid comparison (e.g., the SB
cluster can be positioned to the top-right of the canvas across all
projects). Section 5.2 describes all the interactions supported by
this visualization.
TAB LAYOUT has three options: Nodes, Links, and Trace.
(1) NODES TAB shows a datatable with the nodes selected by
the user with their {Type, ASIL, Name, ID}.
(2) LINKS TAB shows a datatable with the Links data with
their {Source, Relation and Target}.
(3) TRACE TAB (shown in Figure 11) allows the user to find
and visualize if a path exists between two nodes as well
as trace their ASILs (DG4) (e.g., tracing the ASIL from a
System Behavior to a Technical Software Requirement). The
user can set a node as Source and another as Destination.
SafetyLens first checks if a path exists between the two
nodes and overlays it onto the node-link group visualization.
It also returns a linearized node-link diagram showing the
entire route from source to destination. Below the node-
link diagram is a heatmap showing the S-E-C (Severity-
Exposure-Controllability) break up of the ASILs.
Since the visualization canvas and the tab layout are vertically
stacked within a project panel, we positioned each panel side by
side. This way, SafetyLens would facilitate exploratory analyses
within and comparative analyses across projects (DG1, DG2).
(B) SHARED VIEW shows the nodes and links that are common
to / shared by all loaded projects (DG2). These are computed
by performing a set intersection operation across project graphs
based on unique node identifiers. We show it in a separate view
instead of overlaying or highlighting in the same view to make it
easier for domain experts to begin their analysis.
(C) DETAILS VIEW shows all attributes of a node as well as a table
containing all nodes that are connected to this node.
(D) CONTROL PANEL has three tabs: (i) Nodes, (ii) Links, and
(iii) Config with various operations that can be performed (e.g.,
lookups, encodings, layout, preferences for tooltips, and more).
5.2 Interactions
The primary design goals for the user interactions are to facilitate
brushing and linking between views while maintaining a simple and
usable interface. These interaction include:
(A) HOVER The visualization nodes and the datatable rows can be
hovered to highlight neighbours as well as show more information
in the Details View.
(B) CLICK The visualization nodes and the datatable rows can be
(left) clicked to toggle their selections. In addition, right-clicking
on a visualization node opens a context-menu that supports oper-
ations such as Select, Set as Source/Destination, and others.
(C) DRAG The group nodes can be dragged to move the clusters
within the visualization canvas. Similarly, the project panels
themselves can be reordered to aid comparison.
(D) SELECTION The visualization canvas can be used to draw free-
form shapes via a lasso operation to select nodes and links.
(E) SEARCH The Search input field in the Control Panel can be used
to “lookup” and “select” nodes by their names.
(F) FILTER The Control Panel has UI controls (e.g., radio buttons,
checkboxes, dropdowns, interactive legends) that allow the user
to “filter” and “select” the nodes and links in the visualization.
(G) SORT The column headers of datatables in the Tab layout can be
used to sort the selected nodes and links.
5.3 Implementation
SafetyLens is implemented as a web application using Flask (a Python-
based microframework) [4], AngularJS [25], and D3.js [38] . The
Functional Safety data is stored in OrientDB [16].
6 USAGE SCENARIOS
We illustrate how SafetyLens can help domain experts visualize and
interact with Functional Safety datasets. Consider three usage scenar-
ios comprising several subtasks as performed by three hypothetical
users - Chris (analyst), Parker (Chris’s supervisor), and Kyle (analyst)
respectively. These usage scenarios were developed in collaboration
with the domain experts from our interview studies to ensure domain
relevance. Due to confidentiality concerns, project, node, and link
names have been obfuscated. These scenarios are also illustrated in the
accompanying video.
6.1 General Exploratory Tasks
Chris and their colleagues have been actively working on Project-A
(the “Adaptive Cruise Control” System) for a week. They have (i)
identified several Malfunctioning Behaviors and the potential Hazards
that could arise, (ii) assigned a risk level (ASIL) to these hazards
and (iii) defined Safety Goals and requirements (Functional Safety
Requirements) to minimize these risks. Chris wishes to perform a status
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Fig. 6. Report Orphan Nodes and their Types. (1) Default State where
nodes are colored by their Type, (2) Drag the degree slider to zero, (3)
Select the remaining nodes with a lasso operation; these are highlighted
with a black stroke and also added to the nodes datatable below, and (4)
Export the view as an image.
check to determine if the risks associated with the project components
have been reduced to acceptable levels. This includes the following
steps (or tasks).
Find and address Orphan Nodes It is important to ensure that the
defined nodes are connected to other nodes (that is, are not orphan).
By being aware of these orphan nodes, Chris can ensure that these are
not implemented from scratch but instead reused from the same node’s
implementation in another project.
To accomplish this task, Chris first opens the Control Panel and
drags the Degree slider to zero. This filters out the nodes that have at
least one connection. Using a lasso operation, they select these nodes
and export a snapshot of the visualization for future reference. Figure 6
summarizes this task.
Find and report nodes with an unassigned ASIL. After address-
ing orphan nodes, Chris shifts their focus to assigning an ASIL to
each node. The ASIL determines the quality and quantity of safety
measures that are undertaken to minimize associated risks. During this
assignment process, it is possible that a few nodes are either missed or
skipped for later. In both cases, the node is left without a valid ASIL.
To verify this for Hazardous Events, Chris opens the Control Panel
and hides all node types except Hazardous Event. From the ASIL leg-
end, they select the nodes with an ASIL “-” (unassigned). Several nodes
(gray) that do not have an ASIL are selected and added to the datatable
below. Chris shares the selected nodes with their team to discuss and
plan next steps. Chris’s workflow is summarized in Figure 7.
Find Missing Links. After analyzing orphan and ASIL-unassigned
nodes, Chris funnels their attention to analyze specific connections
within the Functional Safety network to ensure that:
1. Each Malfunctioning Behavior (MB) should have a Hazardous
Event (HzE) identified for it.
2. Each HzE should have a Safety Goal (SG) assigned to it.
3. Each SG should define a Functional Safety Requirement (FSR).
4. Each FSR should define a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR).
A domain expert’s role is to address such missing connections at the
earliest. The links in the dataset comprise the Relation attribute that de-
termines the type of connection between two nodes, e.g. associatedHE
connects a Malfunctioning Behavior with a Hazardous Event. A unique
Relation is defined for a connection between nodes of different Types.
To find these missing connections, Chris opens the Control Panel and
switches to the Links tab. As illustrated in Figure 8, they select the
corresponding Relations from the legend that are highlighted in the
visualization. Chris observes that:
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Fig. 7. Find elements that are not yet assigned an ASIL. (1) Default
State where nodes are colored by their ASIL, (2) Deselect all Node Types
except Hazardous Events (HzE), (3) Select all nodes with unassigned
ASILs, and (4) The selected ASILs are highlighted with a black border.
1. associatedHE: HzEs for more than half of MBs are not identified.
2. associatedSafetyGoal: A few HzEs do not have a SG assigned.
3. associatedFSR: All SGs have at least one FSR defined.
4. associatedTSR: Very few FSRs have no TSRs.
From the above usage scenario, Chris found several nodes without an
ASIL, several nodes with zero as well as missing links. They conclude
that even though their Project-A is under active development, there are
gaps in their process that are hampering their efficiency. They take
these results to their team to take required actions.
6.2 Trace ASIL
Another aspect of an analyst’s role is to analyze the ASIL of a node in
comparison with the ASILs of its connections (neighbor, neighbor’s
neighbor, and so on). Consider a Hazardous Event (HzE) that is as-
signed the highest risk classification ASIL=D. It requires Safety Goals
(SG) that can sufficiently minimize the associated risk. By default,
{SGs} inherit the ASIL of the {HzE} ({FSRs} inherit the ASIL of the
{SG}, and {TSRs} inherit the ASIL of the {FSR}) but the analyst may
choose to override it to achieve acceptable risk levels, making visual
analysis of the ASIL trace an important task.
Kyle’s role is to assess risks associated with HzEs and qualitatively
assign an ASIL to them. Their responsibilities also include analyzing
the extent to which Functional Safety is achieved for a node, that is,
finding paths between nodes that are not directly connected via a link.
This way, a project’s maturity (“Are there sufficient nodes and links
implemented for this project?”) as well as completeness (“Most SBs
have a TSR defined now; the project is nearing its completion.”) can be
assessed. Kyle performs the following tasks:
Manually Trace paths. As illustrated in Figure 9, Kyle chooses a
known SB for further analysis. (1) On hovering, they see several links
connecting it with multiple MBs. (2) They select the SB and hover
on one of the MB which highlights the links with HzEs. (3,4) They
continue this process until they reach an FSR. (5) They find that the
FSR does not have a link with an TSR. Since this is a requirement, this
means Functional Safety is still incomplete for the SB in (1).
Find if a Path exists between two Nodes. In the previous task, Kyle
traversed the network manually by following the nodes’ connections.
SafetyLens can also check if a path exists between non-adjacent nodes,
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Fig. 8. Find Missing Links. (1) Each Malfunctioning Behavior (MB) should have a Hazardous Event (HzE). (2) Each HzE should have a Safety
Goal (SG). (3) Each SG should define a Functional Safety Requirement (FSR. (4) Each FSR should define a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR).
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Fig. 9. Manually Trace paths. (1-5): The user is manually tracing a path from a System Behavior (SB) up to a Functional Safety Requirement (FSR).
(5): The FSR does not have a corresponding Technical Safety Requirement (TSR).
that is, nodes that are not directly connected. Consider a scenario to
check if a (Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) exists for a System
Behavior (SB) as illustrated in Figure 11. Kyle imports Project-A into
the Compare View and switches to the Trace Tab in the Project View.
(1) They right click on the SB and set it as Source from the context
menu. (2) They look up the TSR from the search field and set it as
Destination. (3) SafetyLens calculates and finds that a path does exist
between the two nodes. In this way, SafetyLens helps analysts find and
visualize paths between two nodes.
Compare ASILs along a Path. Figure 11 also illustrates an exten-
sion of the previous task to analyze the ASILs of intermediary nodes
along the path. (4) The node-link (rectangles) diagram below reshapes
the overlaid path in the visualization into a linear layout with the Source
and Destination nodes at the ends. The rectangle’s fill color is deter-
mined by the ASIL of the node. Kyle observes that the same ASIL
C has propagated from the Hazardous Event (HzE) to the Technical
Safety Requirement (TSR). To verify if the ASILs are really consis-
tent, they need to analyze their respective breakups into Severity (S),
Exposure (E), and Controllability (C) values. (5) SafetyLens shows
this decomposition of ASIL in the form of a heatmap. Kyle observes
that while {N92, N136, N187, N209} have consistent ASILs, they do
not have consistent Severity (S), Exposure (E), and Controllability (C).
For example, the Controllability of N136 is C2 whereas it should have
ideally been C3 (from N92). In this way, SafetyLens helps analysts
trace ASILs within the functional safety network.
6.3 Find Common Elements Between Projects
Until now we have illustrated how SafetyLens helps domain experts
explore and analyze one project at a time. SafetyLens also supports
simultaneous comparative analysis among multiple projects. We illus-
trate this with another scenario.
In Section 6.1, we illustrated how SafetyLens helped Chris find and
report Malfunctioning Behaviors (MB) that did not have a correspond-
ing Hazardous Event (HzE). With resources likely already allocated
for this project, Chris showed the list to his supervisor, Parker. On
seeing the list, Parker is able to recall a previous project Project-C
where the same elements may have already been defined. They open
SafetyLens but this time select two projects: Project-A and Project-C
from the Dashboard view. An overview (distributions and counts) of
these projects including shared nodes and links can be seen from the
Summary View similar to that shown in Figure 5. Parker sees that there
are common nodes and links among these projects and switches to the
Compare View to find the specific ones.
As illustrated in Figure 10, they see a new Shared Nodes panel at
the top left. SafetyLens, by applying set intersection between network
nodes and links, has pre-computed the shared nodes and links between
the two projects and presented in the same node-link group visualiza-
tion. They hover on a Malfunctioning Behavior (MB) and find that it
is in fact on Chris’s list. (1) Hovering on this node in the shared view
highlights the corresponding nodes in Project-A and Project-C along
with their connections, if any. While there are rightly no links from
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Fig. 10. Find common nodes among Projects. (1) Hover on a node in
the Shared View highlights the common nodes and links in other project
views. (2) There is no link to HzE in Project-A whereas (3) Project-C
has six links to Hze. (4) ‘Select(ing) Connections’ from the context menu
selects the nodes for further analysis.
the MB to any HzE in Project-A (2), there are several links to HzEs in
Project-B (3). Parker right clicks the node of concern in Project-B and
“Selects Connections” from the context menu (4). This selects all nodes
that are connected to this node. Parker exports the list in Project-C and
shares it with Chris who, instead of defining these connections from
scratch, can just re-use them.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Feedback
To validate the design and functionality of SafetyLens, we gathered
user feedback from the same domain experts with whom we conducted
the initial feedback session and for whom the system was designed.
This was performed remotely, with our collaborator at the company
demonstrating the prototype to users with their data (obfuscated in this
paper). The overall feedback was positive.
Users commented that creating an overview encompassing several
projects is currently very time consuming, and once more data is im-
ported in to SafetyLens, would be something that can make their
tasks more effective. Users also commented that seeing their data
in SafetyLens opened up new questions and tasks. For instance, one
participant commented that “this let’s me see projects quickly, and
spot problems. But sometimes things don’t look right, can I edit right
here?” Engineers currently edit the knowledge base that contains these
files, but we will consider adding editing functionality as demonstrated
in [10] and [19] in the future.
Another participant asked “how do I only see what’s changed in
the visualization from the last time I logged in? How do I know if this
ASIL C has undergone revisions, e.g. was previously D?” This opened
up an entire aspect of visualizing temporal changes to data. This was
fascinating as their database currently updates existing data with no
provision to log the revision history. We will consider supporting this
task of temporal evolution of ASIL in the future.
Few participants found aspects of the (node-link group) visualization
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Fig. 11. Finding if a path exists and trace the ASIL along it. (1) Set a
Source (System Behavior (SB)) using the context menu (or search box)
(2) Set the Destination (Technical Safety Requirement (TSR)) by looking
it up in the search box (or context menu) (3) Status of a path’s existence
along with its waypoints. (4) A horizontal node-link diagram which helps
visualize the Trace, as well as the ASILs of nodes. (5) Heatmap to
visualize the decomposition of ASIL ratings into Severity (S) - Exposure
(E) - Controllability (C).
challenging to follow initially and got more comfortable with use. For
example, one participant asked, “what do these (so many node) colors
represent?”. Another participant asked, “what do the spatial positions
of nodes mean?”. This was expected considering our users’ visualiza-
tion literacy and will help us further improve the user experience.
7.2 Deployment
Given the positive feedback to date from pilot users, SafetyLens will
be explored further. This process involves various data permissions,
storage, and other infrastructure challenges. Once deployed, we plan to
gather feedback from users.
7.3 Limitations
SafetyLens in its current state has a few limitations. It is read-only, in
that it does not support authoring data yet. It reads in data from the
graph database only and does not support other ways such as manual
file uploads. While it does have an export functionality to save the
application state as an image, it does not support online collaboration
features such as annotations, commenting, and sharing. We have tested
SafetyLens to facilitate simultaneous comparison of up to five projects
comprising close to thousand nodes and links each. The performance
impact of visualizing more projects is yet to be tested.
8 CONCLUSION
Automotive domain experts perform functional safety of the vehicles
to minimize risks associated with hazards. These domain experts
currently spend a significant amount of time gathering and analyzing
data. We designed and developed SafetyLens, a visual data analysis
tool to help them visualize and interact with Functional Safety datasets.
SafetyLens is a tool that aims to assist Functional Safety analysis
by showing relationships and patterns across projects. This paper
explains our design process, how the user tasks and design goals guided
SafetyLens’s interface design and development, and provided usage
scenarios to explain how the tool can be used to perform existing as
well newer advanced analysis tasks.
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